The monetary-fiscal mix through mid-1976 by Susan R. Roesch
URING recessions Government deficits are ie
garded by some as desirable, and maybe even neces-
sary, to foster economic recovery. The standard argu-
ment is, the more severe the recession, the larger the
dose of fiscal stimulus that is required. The largest
Government deficit in the postwar period — $44.2
billion — was recorded in fiscal 1975, and an even
larger deficit is projected for fiscal 1976. Fiscal
activists contend that such unusually large doses of
fiscal stimulus are required given the unusnal severity
of the current recession.
Monetary policy also takes on a unique character
in the current economic environment. This year, for
the first lime in history, the Federal Reserve System
has made public its intentions for monetary growth
a year in advance. To achieve its broad economic
objectives, the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) has adopted a 5 to 7.5 percent target rate
of growth for the narrowly defined money stock (M,)
for the period from the second quarter of 1975 to the
second qnarter of 1976.1
Thus, monetary and fiscal policies which are in-
tended to foster a turnaround in economic activity
have been put into effect or announced. But given
past relationships between Government deficits and
money supply growth, there is a question regarding
the compatibility of these policies. In practice, mone-
tary and fiscal policy actions do not evolve independ-
ently of each other, In the past, deficits have created
pressures for increased money supply growth — the
greater the deficit, the greater have been the pressures
on the monetary authorities for monetary expansion.
Interest rates provide the link in the decision-
making process between monetary and fiscal actions.
Large Government deficits, which haveto be financed
in private credit markets, have a tendency to depress
prices of Government securities, raise the yields on
these securities, and raise interest rates in general.
This upward pressure on interest rates can be re-
sisted temporarily through Federal Reserve purchases
iThe Ml target originally announced by Arthur Burns on
May 1, 1975, before the Committee on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs of the U. S. Senate was for a 5 to 7.5
percent growth for the period March 1975 to March 1976.
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of Government securities, which inject reserves into
the banking system and expand both the money stock
and the supply of credit. In other words, increases in
deficits put upward pressure on interest rates which,
when resisted by the Federal Reserve, become a
source of monetary expansion.
The current situation does not seem to be an ex-
ception to this historical experience. In the first half of
1975, large sales of Treasury securities were more
than offset by declining private demand for credit,
and interest rates declined over this period. As eco-
nomic recovery progresses, however, it is reasonable
to expect that total credit demands will start to in-
crease. Since June 1975 interest rates have begun to
show signs of upward movement.
In testimony before the Flouse Banking and Cur-
rency Gommittee on July 24, Arthur F. Burns, Chair-
man of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, announced the long-run money stock target
adopted by the Federal Open Market Committee.2
Congressman I-Ienry Reuss expressed a strong pref-
erence for the maintenance of the current level of
interest rates over the target period. Since attainment
of the money stock target might imply higher interest
rates in the short run than would otherwise be the
case, these two views may be in conflict,
This article attempts to trace through the implica-
tions of large Covernment deficits by presenting two
hypothetical scenarios. The first case is one in which
the money stock is permitted to grow at the an-
nounced target of 5 to 7,5 percent from the second
quarter of 1975 to the second quarter of 1976 and
interest rates are permitted to seek their market-
determined level. The second case depicts a situation
where interest rate stabilization would be the target
of the Federal Reserve. In this hypothetical example,
it is assumed for illustrative purposes that purchasing
twice the amount of Covernment debt as in Case I
would attain the interest rate stabilization objective.
2
Chairman Bums anuonnced the following targets for the
period from the second quarter of 1975 to the second
quarter of 1976: Ml, 5t o7.5 percent; M2, 8.5 to 10.5 per-
cent; M3, 10 to 12 percent; credit proxy, 6.5 to 9.5 percent.
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As illustrated in Chart I, the amount of Government
debt outstanding increased at a very slow 1 percent
annual rate from the early 1950s to the early 1960s.~
At the same time the amount of debt held by the
Federal Reserve System increased at a 2 percent
rate and, as can he seen in the bottom two tiers in
Chart I, both the monetary base and the money stock
increased at less than a 2 percent average annual
rate.4 From late 1961 to mid-1975, net Federal Covern-
ment debt increased at a 3.5 percent annual rate.
During this period, however, the Federal Reserve
increased its holdings of debt at an 8.5 percent annual
rate.
As the Federal Reserve was increasing its holdings
of debt outstanding at an accelerated rate, growth of
the monetary base and the money stock also in-
creased. In the early 1960s, money and base grew at
average annual rates of 3.4 and 4.4 percent, re-
spectively. From the mid-1960s to the present, growth
rates of money and base have averaged between 6
and 8 percent over extended periods. On balance, the
monetary base and the money stock increased at rates
of 5.7 and 5.1 percent, respectively, from late 1961 to
mid-1975.
The FOMC established a 5 to 7.5 percent target
rate of growth for the money stock for the period
from the second quarter of 1975 to the second quarter
of 1976. If the money stock increased at a 8.25 per-
cent rate (mid-point of the range) during this period,
the level of M, for the second quarter of 1976 would
be $308.4 billion — an increase of $18.1 billion, as
indicated by line I on the bottom tier of Chart I.
The crucial question regarding attainment of this level
of M, is what dollar volume of securities would have
to be acquired by the Federal Reserve System?
In order to illustrate a procedure for making such
a determination, the growth of money stock must be
related to growth of the monetary base. Assuming
that reserve requirements, deposit distribution among
various classes of banks, and the public’s preference
~The outstanding Government debt referred to in this article
is total gross public debt minus debt held by U. S. Govern-
ment agencies and trust funds,
4
The monetary base is defined as the net monetary liabilities
of the Federal Reserve and Treasury. For further explana-
tion, see both the Appendix to this article and Leonall C.
Andersen and Jerry L. Jordan, “The Monetary Base — Ex-
planation and Analytical Use,” this Review (August 1968),
pp. 7-11.
for utilization of reserves remain unchanged, one can
derive the growth of the monetary base which would
correspond to the targeted money stock growth (see
Appendix for a more detailed derivation). If 80 per-
cent of this increase in the base results from pur-
chases of Government securities by the System,5 the
change in the holdings of securities by the System
associated with the 6,25 percent target money growth
can be determined.
This procedure indicates that the monetary base
would have to increase by about $8 billion in order
for the money stock to increase $18.1 billion from
the second quarter of 1975 to the second quarter of
1978. This would mean that the System~sholdings of
securities would increase by about $6.4 billion through
the second quarter of 1976, about 7.5 percent of the
estimated sales of net Government debt during this
period.°
iT’
In this hypothetical example, the primary assump-
tion is that in order to stabilize interest rates at pre-
vailing levels, the Federal Reserve will have to pur-
chase more of the increased Government debt than
is necessary to attain the announced M, target growth.
The exact amount of such purchases is not known with
any degree of certainty; however, for illustrative pur-
poses only, it is assumed that the System would have
to purchase twice the amount of Government debt
indicated in Case I, or 15 percent. The Federal Re-
serve currently owns about 22 percent of the Federal
debt outstanding.
Purchasing 15 percent of the projected Government
funding requirements for fiscal 1976 would result in
a $13 billion increase in the Federal Reserve’s hold-
ings of Government securities. An increase of this
magnitude implies a 14 percent increase in both the
monetary base and the money stock.
If the monetary multiplier does not exceed its his-
torical variations, these two Cases illustrate that main-
tenance of the announced targets of monetary growth
and current levels of interest rates may not he com-
patible. If an attempt is made to maintain current
levels of interest rates and private credit demands in-
crease, then the money stock would have to rise at a
more rapid rate than that targeted by the FOMC.
5
Currently, the holdings of securities by the Federal Reserve
System constitute approximately 80 percent of total Snone-
tar)’ base.
°‘fhedebt figures for the second quarter of 1976 are estimated
by this Bank using the revised budget figures released May
30, 1975 by the Office of Management and Budget.
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There are, of course, analysts who believe that
growth of money stock in the range of 14 percent for
the period under consideration (one year) is of no
consequence.7 They argue that recovery would be
stifled if interest rates were permitted to rise, and
money stock growth could be reduced as the economy
approaches its capacity. The subsequent section pre-
sents some evidence on the relationships between
money growth and economic activity.
History has shown that economic conditions are
affected by movements in the money stock and,
hence, by Federal Reserve purchases of Government
securities. Since the above two Cases differ consider-
ably in the rate of money growth and the amount of
securities purchased by the Federal Reserve System,
each Case would have different implications for out-
put, prices, and, as already discussed, interest rates.
Chart II depicts historical relationships between
changes in the money stock and changes in output,
prices, and unemployment. The first tier of this Chart
depicts the short-run fluctuations and long-run (trend)
growth in the money stock. Since about 1961, the
trend growth of the money stock has been rising.
Historically, the trend growth rate of the money
stock has been associated with a similar rate of change
in the price level (Chart II, second tier).
Short-run fluctuations in growth of the money
stock have been associated with temporary corre-
sponding changes in the rate of real output growth.
The first four shaded areas on Chart II are periods
of business recessions as defined by the National
Bureau of Economic Research. Prior to each of the
recessions, the rate of growth of the money stock
declined relative to its trend.
Case I assumes an average rate of growth of the
money stock of about 6.25 percent through the second
quarter of 1976. Such a rate of money growth would
continue the trend growth that has prevailed since
late 1971. On the basis of historical relationships, this
money stock growth would result in about a 8 percent
rate of increase in prices. Since this rate of money
growth represents a marked increase from the rate
which prevailed in late 1974 and early 1975, historical
T
For example, see Franco Modigliani and Lucas Papademos,
“Targets for Monetary Policy in the Coining Year,” Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity (1, 1975), pp. 141-163.
relationships also imply a short-run stimulus to real
output.
Case II is associated with a much more rapid
rate of money stock growth. The relationships pre-
sented in Chart II indicate that rapid monetary growth
probably would provide a strong stimulus to expan-
sion of real output in the short run, To the extent that
this very rapid growth in the money stock were main-
tained long enough to increase the trend growth of
money, however, the rate of inflation would also grad-
ually increase. If, in an attempt to prevent the re-
emergence of inflationary pressures at a later time,
the sharp increase in the rate of growth of the money
stock were followed by a correspondingly sharp con-
traction in money growth, historical evidence indicates
that a sharp decline could occur in the growth of
real output and employment.
It is generally accepted that the supply of and
demand for funds determine the level of interest
rates. In each Case the increase in the supply of
securities (demand for credit) i~ythe Treasury is
assumed to be the same.8 The implications for inter-
est rates in each Case depends, therefore, on the rela-
tive amount of Government securities taken by the
Federal Reserve, and the differential influence of each
Case on the growth of output and expectations re-
garding the rate of inflation. These latter two influ-
ences affect growth of private credit demand.
Case I, it may be recalled, implied that the System
would purchase about $6.4 billion of the increase in
debt outstanding through the second quarter of 1976.
In Case II it was assumed that tile System would pur-
chase a much larger amount of securities than in
Case I. For this reason, upward pressure on interest
rates would not he expected to be initially as strong
for Case II as for Case I. The larger the volume of
Government debt demanded by the Federal Reserve
System, the higher the price, and the lower that in-
terest rates would be in the’ short run. On the other
hand, Case II indicates faster growth of output in
the short run and re-emergence of more rapid in-
flation and inflationary expectations. These increases
in expectations of inflation would tend to suggest
sharply higher market interest rates in the long run
than would occur in Case I.
~This assumption is made only for the sake of simplicity. It is
recognized that Govensinent deficits are affected by the rate
of money supply growth in such a way that the supply nf
Government debt obligations would he somewhat less in
Case II than in Case I.
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This article relates the projected huge increase in
the amount of debt outstanding to two sets of in-
creases in purchases of Government securities by the
Federal Reserve System. Case I assumed that the Sys-
tem purchased an amount of Government securities
which was based on the attainment of the money
stock growth rate target of the FOMC announced in
July. Case II was based on hypothetical estimates of
Federal Reserve purchases of Government debt which
might be necessary to resist short-run rises in interest
rates.
The monetary growth target established by the
Federal Open Market Committee may imply some-
what higher interest rates temporarily and somewhat
slower recovery from the cmTent recession than the
interest rate levels and recovery growth advocated
by some economists and some policymakers. If total
credit demands increase with improved economic
activity, interest rates will be subjected to upward
pressure. An attempt to maintain market rates at
current levels could produce an undesirable choice
of alternatives: either the acceptance of a high rate
of inflation or the re-occurrence of recession when
money growth is sharply curtailed to cheek inflation.
APPENIJIX
This Appendix illustrates the derivation of the amount
of securities which the Federal Reserve would purchase
in order to produce the announced target rate of growth
of the money stock. The step-by-step procedure described
here is an explanation of the figures used in Case I of the
accompanying article.
The monetary base is derived from the consolidated
balance sheets of the Federal Reserve and Treasury.
The monetary base is defined as the monetary assets of
the private sector; therefore, the account is rearranged so
that only the liabilities of the Treasury and the Federal
Reserve System, which are held by the private sector, are
shown on the liabilities side of the balance sheet. An
increase in the monetary base increases the money supply
through a multiplier effect. A given amount of monetary
base generally upports about 2.5 times this amount in
money stock.
Table I
Monetary Base Case I
11/75 — 11/76
(BrOken of001larsI
1) hfloat $ 0 6) Acurrency $56
2) Asorrow6ngs 0.0 7) Ant on Os
atrand Depont Ii
3) Arreasury Oepossts 8 ARR on Wet
at Fed 0 TOme Deposets B
4) AS curetes 64 9) Ant on CD
hAIl Other .6 10) hvatslt Cash of
t4an-Mera,ber
Banks I
AMonetery Ba e $8 0 hMon to y Bose $B 0
Money stock is defined as the sum of currency and
demand deposits n the hands of the public. The target
rate of money growth of 5 to 7.5 percent for the period
from the second quarter of 1975 to the second quarter
of 1976 implies an increase of $18.1 billion in the money
stock. Currency was assumed to grow about as rapidly
as personal income, or about 8 percent doring this period
— a $5.6 billion increase. Every dollar increase in cur-
rency requires a dollar increase in monetary base, therefore
Item 6i nthe accompanying Table is derived. The re-
maining portion of the money stock is comprised of de-
mand deposits. By multiplying the estimated portion of
member bank demand deposits by the average reserve
requirement ratio on demand deposits, Item 7 is found,
Using the other announced aggregate targets,’ the in-
crease in net time deposits can be derived. Multiplying
this amount by the reserve requirement on these deposits,
Item 8 is estimated. An increase in credit demand would
imply an increase in CDs over this period. Again the
change would be multiplied by the reserve requirement
on these deposits. Historical extrapolation indicates an
approximate increase in nonmember bank vault cash that
would be expected over this period (Item 10). These
items are then totaled to derive the change in the “re-
quired” reserves and currency over the period — $8
billion.
Recenfly, holdings of securities by the Federal Reserve
System account for 80 percent of the monetary base. For
this reason, 80 percent of the increase in monetary base
is assumed to be in the form of System holdings of se-
curities (Item 4). Because float and Treasury deposits at
the Federal Reserve are highly volatile and have no trend
over time, these items are assumed to be unchanged, on
balance, over the period (Items 1 and 3).
The level of member hank borrowings from Federal
Reserve Banks recently has been very low. If credit
demands increase, member banks borrowings would also
increase, possibly to the level that existed last year, ex-
cluding the borrowing of one large New York bank (Item
2). The “all other” item comprises the remainder of the
increase in the monetary base.
tIn testimony before the House of Representatives, Committee
on Banking and Currency, on July 24, 1975, Chairman Bums
announced the following targets for the second quarter of
1975 to the second quarter of 1976 period: Ml, 5 to 7.5
percent; M2, 8.5 to 10.5 percent; M3, 10 to 12 percent;
credit proxy, 6.5 to 9.5 percent.
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